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1 Introduction
In standard axiomatic bargaining models originated from Nash (1950), a
typical interpretation of the solution to bargaining problems is the recom-
mendation made by a “fair arbitrator” such as the Judge in civil trials, or the
function of Dispute Settlement Body in the WTO mechanism, etc. In such
models, the recommendation is based solely on players’ utilities. In many
contexts, however, the “fair arbitrator” may have other principles in mind
when making a recommendation.
For instance, consider the distribution issue of a father’s inheritance
among his children. The father, as a “fair arbitrator,” may have the prin-
ciple of “equal opportunities” for his children and would like to distribute
his wealth among his children giving them equal opportunities to do well in
their respective lives. Likewise, when educational resources are to be allo-
cated among local public schools, the local government’s board of education,
as the “fair arbitrator,” may propose an allocation that “equalizes” school
children’s opportunity sets for future jobs, skills, college admissions, lives, etc.
In both settings of the above examples, each recommendation of a resource
allocation by the “fair arbitrator” eﬀectively identifies a profile of “opportu-
nities” or opportunity sets for individuals involved. The crucial diﬀerence
from standard axiomatic bargaining models in these examples is that the
recommendation made by the arbitrator is not based on utilities of the in-
dividuals involved, but on opportunity sets that the recommended resource
allocation may give rise to the involved individuals.
This departure from considerations of utilities of individuals to concerns
of opportunity sets of individuals is well in line with the recent literature on
opportunities and equality of opportunities. One stream of the literature is
in political philosophy such as Sen (1980, 1985), Arneson (1989), and Cohen
(1993), while the other stream is in economics, see, for example, Sen (2002),
Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Kranich (1996), and Herrero (1997). In the latter
stream of the literature, each individual is characterized by his opportunity
sets, from which his well-being or welfare is evaluated.
An opportunity set of an individual is interpreted as a set of feasible
options or alternatives available to the individual for living a life. Depending
on the context, those alternatives can be commodity bundles, or bundles
of characteristics à la Lancaster and Gorman, or bundles of functionings à
la Sen (1980, 1985). A resource allocation in an economy then identifies
a collection of opportunity sets, one for each individual in the economy.
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Note that, for a given resource allocation, opportunity sets of individuals are
necessarily interdependent. Note also that diﬀerent resource allocations can
give rise to various collections of opportunity sets for the individuals in the
economy.
The question that we want to have an answer in this paper is the fol-
lowing. Among various collections of opportunity sets for the individuals
involved, how should the “fair arbitrator” make the recommendation on a
resource allocation that yields a profile of opportunity sets for individuals
in the economy deemed as “fair”? For this purpose, we extend standard
bargaining models to the setting in which each individual is endowed with
his opportunity sets, which are generated by his consumption bundles given
his individual characteristics, and, in which the fair arbitrator makes rec-
ommendations based on profiles of opportunity sets for the individuals in
the economy.1 In particular, we reformulate the three classical solutions, the
Nash, the egalitarian, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky, in our context and study
them axiomatically.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we in-
troduce our economic environments and our problem. Section 3 presents our
axioms. Section 4 defines and axiomatically characterizes the three solutions,
the Nash, the egalitarian, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky, in our context. We
conclude the paper in Section 5 by briefly commenting on our approach and
the results.
2 Economic environments and bargaining prob-
lems on opportunity assignments
There are (possibly) infinitely many types of goods (commodities). The
universe of “potential goods” is denoted by Ξ, and the class of non-empty
and finite subsets of Ξ is designated by M, with generic elements, K, L,
M ,. . .,. The cardinality of M ∈ M is denoted by #M . Given M ∈ M, let
Rm+ , where m = #M , designate the Cartesian product of #M copies of R+ .
For eachM ∈M, let us denote generic commodity bundle in Rm+ by x ∈ Rm+ .
The population in the economy is given by the set N = {1, · · · , n}, where
1Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003) discuss allocation mechanisms which assign individuals
capability sets through distributing outputs produced by them. Their approach is quite
diﬀerent from the approach based on bargaining that this paper addresses.
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2 ≤ n < +∞. Given a list of commodities M ∈M, every individual has a
common consumption space Rm+ . There are k basic living conditions in the
economy, which are relevant for all individuals for the purpose of describing
their objective well-beings attainable by means of their consumption vectors.
These basic living conditions can be interpreted broadly. For example, they
can be skills that individuals can develop through education, or they can be
occupations which individual can engage in after the graduation of school.
Or they can be characteristics of commodities in the sense of Gorman (1980)
and Lancaster (1966), or they can be various functionings according to Sen
(1980, 1985). For our formal analysis, we do not need to stick to a particular
interpretation though a certain interpretation may be more appropriate than
other interpretations for a given context.
Thus, an achievement of living condition f , where f = 1, 2, · · · , k, by
individual i is denoted by bif ∈ R+. Individual i’s achievement of basic
living conditions is given by listing bif : bi = (bi1, · · · , bik) ∈ Rk+. Given
M ∈ M, each individual i ∈ N can be characterized by his opportunity
correspondence cmi : Rm+ ³ Rk+ which associates to every consumption vector
xi ∈ Rm+ a non-empty subset cmi (xi) of Rk+. The intended interpretation
is that i is able to have access to each living-condition vector bi ∈ cmi (xi)
by means of his consumption vector xi. Each opportunity correspondence
satisfies the following requirements:
(a) For all xi, x0i ∈ Rm+ such that xi ≤ x0i, cmi (xi) ⊆ cmi (x0i) hold;2
(b) For some xi ∈ Rm+\{0}, cmi (xi) ∩Rk++ 6= ∅ holds, and cmi (0) = {0};
(c) For all xi ∈ Rm+ , cmi (xi) is compact and comprehensive in Rk+; and
(d) cmi is continuous on Rk+.
Let CM be the set of all possible opportunity correspondences defined on
Rm+ , which satisfy the above (a), (b),(c) and (d). GivenM ∈M, an economy
with x endowments of M-goods is described by a list e = (M, cm, x) =
(M, (cmi )i∈N , x), where M ∈M, cm ∈ CMn, x ∈ Rm+ , and CMn stands for the
n-fold Cartesian product of CM . Let EM be the class of all such economies
with x endowments of M-goods. Let E ≡ ∪
M∈M
EM . Given e = (M, cm, x) ∈
EM , a vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ Rmn+ is feasible for e ∈ EM if for all i ∈ N ,
xi ∈ Rm+ , and
P
xi ≤ x. We denote by A(e) the set of feasible allocations
2For all vectors a = (a1, . . . , ap) and b = (b1, . . . , bp) ∈ Rp, a ≥ b if and only if ai ≥ bi
(i = 1, . . . , p); a > b if and only if a ≥ b and a 6= b; a À b if and only if ai > bi
(i = 1, . . . , p).
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for e ∈ EM . Let A(E) ≡ ∪
e∈E
A(e).
For each individual i ∈ N , given M ∈M and given i’s consumption vec-
tor xi, cmi (xi) generates a opportunity set Ci = c
m
i (xi) for i. An opportunity
assignment is a list of n opportunity sets one for each individual in the so-
ciety. Given e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E , the set of possible opportunity assignments
for e ∈ E is:
C(e) ≡ {C = (Ci)i∈N ⊆ Rkn+ | ∃ x = (xi)i∈N ∈ A(e) : Ci = cmi (xi) (∀i ∈ N)}.
Note that for any e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E , any C = (Ci)i∈N ∈ C(e), and any i ∈
N , the opportunity Ci is a compact, comprehensive set in Rk+ containing the
origin. For each i ∈ N and each living condition f = 1, . . . , k, let maxf (Ci)
be the maximum amount of living condition f by i that he can achieve under
his opportunity Ci ; that is, maxf (Ci) ≡ max {bf | (b1, · · · , bf , · · · , bk) ∈ Ci}.
Let Σ ≡ {C | ∃e ∈ E : C = C(e)} be the class of all such possible sets of
opportunity assignments. Note that each set C in Σ is compact in terms of
Hausdorﬀ metric by the assumption (d) of the opportunity correspondence
and the fact that A(e) is compact for every e ∈ E . Also, for any C ∈ Σ, if
C = (Ci)i∈N ∈ C, then for each j ∈ N , every living condition f = 1, . . . , k,
and any bf ≤ maxf (Cj), there exists C0 =
¡
C 0j,C−j
¢
∈ C such that bf =
maxf
¡
C 0j
¢
and C 0j ⊆ Cj by the assumption of (a), (b), and (d) of opportunity
correspondences.
Note that for each C ∈ Σ and every i ∈ N , there exists C∗j ∈ K such
that for every C ∈ C, C∗i ⊇ Ci holds, and
¡
C∗i ,C
0
−i
¢
∈ C with C0j ≡ {0}
for any j 6= i. This is followed from the requirement (a) of opportunity
correspodences and the definition of Σ. Given C ∈ Σ, let us denote such C∗i
by mi(C) for each i ∈ N .
The formal problem that we are interested in is the bargaining problem
over opportunity assignments among individuals. Analogous to the standard
bargaining model, we can interpret each C ∈ Σ as a bargaining problem,
and a solution to the problem is to pick up a subset of opportunity assign-
ments {C = (Ci)i∈N} from C. Then, a bargaining solution in this context is
a correspondence F which associates to every C ∈ Σ, a non-empty subset
F (C) ⊆ C.
How is our model related to the motivation discussed in the Introduction?
The following examples may help us in understanding our approach.
Example 1: Let k be the number of skills that an individual can develop
through education, and let x ∈ Rm+ be an educational resource. Then, the k
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dimensions of the opportunity set cmi (x) ⊆ Rk+ represent the types of skills,
and each element bi = (bif)f∈{1,...,k} ∈ cmi (x) implies that individual i can
develop the level of each skill f up to bif , whenever he is educated with the
educational support x and some amount of his own eﬀort. The diﬀerence of
native talents among individuals is reflected in the diﬀerence of opportunity
correspondences among them. In this setting, the bargaining problem would
be to assign opportunities for future skills by allocating educational resources.
Example 2: The WTO consists of many member countries and a part of its
functions is to settle disputes among its member countries. Disputes between
or among member countries are really about net trades of goods, services or
capital. The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is thus to make rec-
ommendations as how to structure net trades among the aﬀected member
countries.3 Each member country is concerned about, for example, the ag-
gregagte employment rate, the growth rates of several sectors like manufac-
turing, agriculture, and service, and the health condition of its population.
These concerns of a member country correspond to our notion of achieve-
ments. Each member country’s interests can be captured by the country’s
opportunity sets representing opportunities to have a certain degree of em-
ployment rate, to have reasonable growth rates for its concerned sectors, and
to oﬀer its population a good health. The bargaining problem can then be
interpreted as follows. The Dispute Settlement Body in theWTOmechanism
acts as the fair arbitrator and it recommends the settlements that aﬀect net
trade based on equal opportunities for the disputed member countries along
the factors that we discussed above.
Example 3: Our last example concerns the allocation of the budget by
a central government to its several local jurisdictions. In many cases, the
allocation of the budget by the central government to its local jurisdictions
intends for diﬀerent localities to have equal opportunities for growth and
for access to clean water, for example. Growth and access to clean water
are two of the many factors that diﬀerent local jurisdictions are concerned
3Quite often, disputes seemingly are about things like access to member countries’
markets and information, legal protection concerning trades from member countries, or
pricing rules. These are rules governing trade between and among nations and they have
direct eﬀect on net trade between member countries. As a consequence, we can interpret
that disputes are really about net trade.
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about, and local governments are concerned about their opportunities along
these factors. The bargaining problem in this example can thus be viewed
as the fair arbitrator, the central government, makes budgetary allocations
on the basis of equal opportunies for diﬀerent local jurisdictions along those
factors such as growth and environmenal quality of each region.
3 Axioms
3.1 Properties on orderings over opportunity sets
Let us denote the universal set of opportunity by K. Note that K is the uni-
versal class of compact, comprehensive subsets in Rk+ containing the origin.
Thus, C ∈ K implies for any M ∈ M, there exists cm ∈ CM such that for
some x ∈ Rm+ , cm (x) = C. Suppose that the society has a value judgement on
wellness of capabilities, which is represented by a binary relation R ⊆ K×K.
The relation R satisfies reflexivity: [for all C ∈ K, (C,C) ∈ R], complete-
ness: [for all C,C 0 ∈ K, (C,C 0) ∈ R or (C 0, C) ∈ R], and transitivity: [for
all C,C 0, C 00 ∈ K, if (C,C 0) ∈ R & (C 0, C 00) ∈ R, then (C,C 00) ∈ R]. Thus,
R is an ordering over K. Note P and I are respectively the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of R.
For all C,C 0 ∈ K, we write C > C 0 if for all c0 ∈ C 0, there exists c ∈ C
such that cÀ c0. Note that, given the comprehensiveness of opportunity sets
in K, when C > C 0, necessarily, we have C 0 as a proper subset of C.
In this paper, we assume that, the ordering R on K satisfies the following
two properties:4
Monotonicity: For all C,C 0 ∈ K, if C ⊇ C 0 then (C,C 0) ∈ R, and if
C > C 0, then (C,C 0) ∈ P .
Representability: There exists a real-valued, continuous function G : K→
R+ such that for all C,C 0 ∈ K,
G (C) ≥ G(C 0)⇔ (C,C 0) ∈ R and G (C) > G(C 0)⇔ (C,C 0) ∈ P .
The ordering R is homothetic if for any C,C
0 ∈ K, and any α > 0,
(C,C 0) ∈ R⇔
¡
α · C,α · C 0¢ ∈ R, and (C,C 0) ∈ P ⇔ ¡α · C,α · C 0¢ ∈ P .
4It may be remarked that there are many examples of such orderings. For detailed
discussions, see, for example, Pattanaik and Xu (2000) and Xu (2002, 2003).
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3.2 Axioms on bargaining solutions
In this subsection, we shall present and discuss axioms on bargaining solu-
tions over opportunity assignments. The first two axioms are the correspond-
ing eﬃciency type axioms in standard bargaining models.
Eﬃciency (E): For each C ∈ Σ and each C = (Ci)i∈N ∈ F (C), there is no
C0 = (C 0i)i∈N ∈ C such that for every i ∈ N , C 0i ⊇ Ci, and for some j ∈ N ,
C 0j > Cj.
Weak Eﬃciency (WE): For each C ∈ Σ and each C = (Ci)i∈N ∈ F (C),
there is no C0 = (C 0i)i∈N ∈ C such that for every i ∈ N , C 0i > Ci.
Therefore, the axiom (E) requires that, for a opportunity assignmentC to
be considered as a part of the solution to a problem, there must not exist an-
other feasible opportunity assignment C0 such that Ci ⊆ C 0i for all i ∈ N and
C 0i > Ci for at least one i ∈ N . (E) corresponds to the usual eﬃciency axiom
in the standard bargaining model. (WE) is a weaker requirement than (E)
and requires that the solution should not select an opportunity assignment
that is strictly dominated by another feasible opportunity assingment.
To introduce our next two axioms, we first define notions of a symmetric
opportunity assignment and related concepts. Let C ∈ Σ. We say that
C ∈ Σ is symmetric if for every permutation π : N → N , and for every
C = (Ci)i∈N ∈ C, π (C) ≡
¡
Cπ(i)
¢
i∈N ∈ C holds. If C∗ = (C∗i )i∈N ∈ Kn
is such that C∗i = C
∗
j for any i, j ∈ N , then C∗ is said to be a symmetric
opportunity assignment.
Let Λ ⊆ R+ be a set of index numbers with the minimal value 0 ∈ Λ. Let
{Cs}s∈Λ ⊆ Kn be a sequence of symmetric assignments such that (a) for any
s ∈ Λ, Cs ∈ Kn is a symmetric assignment; (b) for any s, s0 ∈ Λ with s < s0,
Cs ⊆ Cs0; and (c) C0 = {0}. We call such {Cs}s∈Λ a monotone path of
symmetric assignments. In general, Λ is not a closed set. If Λ is closed, then
there exists the maximal symmetric assignment Cs
∗
in {Cs}s∈Λ. In this case,
{Cs}s∈Λ is called a closed monotone path of symmetric assignments. C ∈ Σ
is said to be symmetric with a closed monotone symmetric path of symmetric
assignments {Cs}s∈Λ if C is symmetric, and {Cs}s∈Λ ⊆ C is such that the
maximal symmetric assignment Cs
∗
is a weakly eﬃcient assignment in C.
Anonymity (A): For each C ∈ Σ, if C is symmetric, then for every C ∈
F (C) and every permutation π over N , π (C) ∈ F (C).
8
Symmetry (S): For all C ∈ Σ, if C is symmetric with a closed monotone
symmetric path of symmetric assignments {Cs}s∈Λ, then F (C)∩{Cs}s∈Λ 6=
∅, and for no C ∈ F (C), Ci > Cj for some i, j ∈ N .
The axiom (A) requires that, for each symmetric problem, if an oppor-
tunity assignment C is selected by the solution, so is every permutation of
C. The axiom (S) stipulates that, for each symmetric problem with a closed
monotone symmetric path of symmetric assignments {Cs}s∈Λ, then the solu-
tion selects at least one opportunity assignment from {Cs}s∈Λ, and further,
for no opportunity assignment selected by the solution is such that one indi-
vidual’s opportunity set strictly dominates another individual’s opportunity
set.
The following axioms are analogous to the axioms of contraction indepen-
dence and of weak contraction independence in standard bargaining models:
Contraction Independence (CI): For each C, C0 ∈ Σ with C ⊇ C0, if
F (C) ∩ C0 6= ∅, then F (C0) = F (C) ∩ C0.
Weak Contraction Independence (WCI): For each C, C0 ∈ Σ with C ⊇
C0 and mi (C) = mi (C0) for all i ∈ N , if F (C) ∩ C0 6= ∅, then F (C0) =
F (C) ∩ C0.
The axiom (CI) corresponds to Nash’s Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives in standard bargaining models. It requires that if an opportunity
assignment is chosen from a “larger” problem and is still available when the
larger problem shrinks to a smaller problem, then it should be chosen from
the smaller problem as well. (WCI) is a restrictive version of (CI) by re-
quiring two problems of having the same “ideal” opportunity assignment.
Its origin in standard bargaining models goes back to Yu (1973) (see Xu
and Yoshihara (2005) for an application of this axiom in characterizing the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for nonconvex problems).
The next axiom is perhaps most controversial in our context:
Invariance to Aﬃne Changes in opportunity Correspondences (IACC):
For each C, C0 ∈ Σ, if there exists a vector a = (ai)i∈N ∈ Rn++ such that
C0 = ©a ·C = (ai · Ci)i∈N ⊆ Rkn+ | C ∈ Cª, then C ∈ F (C)⇔ a ·C ∈ F (C0).
We first note that the axiom of (IACC) cannot be interpreted as an analogy
to the scale invariance axiom of standard bargaining problems over utility
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allocations. The k components of living conditions are assumed to be com-
mon to all individuals and are supposed to be objectively measurable. These
units are used to identify each individual’s attainable living-condition vectors
and each individual’s opportunity sets. Consequently, the fair arbitrator can
make interpersonal comparisons of living-condition vectors and interpersonal
comparisons of opportunity sets. The common social ordering R over oppor-
tunity sets for all individuals can be justified on the ground that there exist
such k units for measuring living-condition levels.
Given this implicit presumption in our framework, we cannot interpret
the change of one individual’s opportunity set from Ci to C 0i = ai · Ci as
the change in units of k living conditions for measuring individual i’s well-
being. If it was so, other individuals’ opportunity sets would have also been
transformed by the same aﬃne parameter ai. The axiom (IACC), however,
permits the situation of ai 6= aj between two diﬀerent individuals i and j.
Therefore, we are reluctant to interpret the axiom (IACC) in terms of the
invariance to interpersonally diﬀerent units of k living conditions.
The most plausible interpretation of the change from Ci to C 0i = ai · Ci
is, we think, the change of i’s opportunity correspondence. In other words,
individual i’s “productivity” of living conditions is either improved (ai > 1)
or deteriorated (ai < 1). The axiom (IACC) then suggests that the change
in relative bargaining powers as reflected in each individual i’s ai should not
aﬀect the underlying resource allocations of commodities. In a sense, the
axiom seems to protect a relatively weak bargainer from a relatively strong
bargainer. On the other hand, the axiom (IACC) also suggests that the
society should not compensate someone for the deterioration of his “produc-
tivity” of living conditions through a redistributive policy.
Our final axiom is an informational requirement on a solution to a problem
and is stated below:
Informational Invariance (II) : For each C ∈ Σ and each C = (Ci)i∈N ,C0 =
(C 0i)i∈N ∈ C, if C ∈ F (C) and (C 0i, Ci) ∈ I for all i ∈ N , then C0 ∈ F (C).
According to the axiom (II), if two opportunity assignments are “equiva-
lent” in the sense that the two opportunity sets for each and every individual
specified by the corresponding opportunity assignments are ranked equally,
then whenever one opportunity assignment is chosen by the solution, the
other opportunity assignment should be chosen by the solution as well. The
axiom (II) thus implies that the informational requirement in our context is
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contained exclusively in the social evaluation ordering R. A similar axiom,
called No Discrimination, is discussed by Thomson (1983) in the context of
fair allocation problems.
4 Three Bargaining Solutions and Their Char-
acterizations
In this section, we first reformulate the three well-known solution concepts
for standard bargaining models in our context.
Nash Solution: Given a social evaluation of opportunity sets R and its real-
valued representation G, a bargaining solution FNA is the Nash solution if,
for every C ∈ Σ,
FNA(C) =
(
C ∈ C |
Y
i∈N
G (Ci) ≥
Y
i∈N
G (C 0i) (∀C0 ∈ C)
)
.
Egalitarian Solution: Given a social evaluation of opportunity sets R,
a bargaining solution FE is the egalitarian solution if, for every C ∈ Σ,
C ∈ FE(C) implies that: (1) there is no other C0 ∈ C such that (C 0i, Ci) ∈ P
for all i ∈ N ; and (2) (Ci, Cj) ∈ I holds for any i ,j ∈ N .
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution: Given a social evaluation of opportunity
sets R and its real-valued representation G, a bargaining solution FKS is the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if, for every C ∈ Σ, C ∈ FKS(C) implies that:
(1) there is no other C0 ∈ C such that (C 0i, Ci) ∈ P for all i ∈ N ; and (2)
G (Ci) /G (mi(C)) = G (Cj) /G (mj(C)) .
All the above three solutions should be designed, depending on the type
of ordering on K. Thus, if the social ranking over opportunities is changed,
then the recommendation by a bargaining solution would be changed. This
is because there is no a priori, unique measure for evaluating diﬀerent op-
portunity sets appropriately. Note that in case of the standard bargaining
models with individual utilities, there is no diﬃculty in measuring individ-
uals’ utility levels. In case of bargaining over opportunities, however, we
may have to begin with the discussion on how to measure opportunity sets.
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But, we would like to leave the selection process of a measure unspecified,
and only suppose that a society chooses a specific measure for opportunity
sets by consulting the literature in ranking over opportunity sets. This is
because, even given any desired measure of opportunities, there still remains
an important and uncultivated issue of what is an appropriate recommenda-
tion for allocating opportunity sets under the interrelatedness of individuals’
opportunities, which we would like to focus on in this paper.
Before we present our characterization results, the following observations
are useful throughout this section. Let G be the real-valued representation
of R, defined by (*). For each bargaining problem C ∈ Σ, we define
G (C) ≡ ©G (C) = (G (Ci))i∈N ∈ Rn+ | C ∈ Cª .
Let ∂G (C) be the upper boundary of G (C). Since C is derived from an
underlying economic environment e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E , where cm is a profile
of opportunity correspondences satisfying the requirements (a), (b), (c), and
(d), and G is continuous on K, ∂G (C) constitutes a connected set in Rn+.
Moreover, since C is comprehensive by the requirements (a), (b), and (d)
of opportunity correspondences, G (C) must be comprehensive. Finally, by
choosing g (0) = 0 for the zero vector 0 ∈ Rk+, G (C) has 0 ∈ Rn+ as its
element, since ({0} , . . . , {0})| {z }
n-times
∈ C.
4.1 The egalitarian solution
We first give a characterization of the egalitarian solution and its proof fol-
lows.
Theorem 1: Let the social evaluation of opportunity R be given. Then, the
egalitarian solution FE is the unique solution satisfying (WE), (S), (CI) and
(II).
Proof. First, it may be checked that FE satisfies the four axioms of the
theorem.
Next, we show that if a solution F satisfies (WE), (S), (CI) and (II), then
F = FE. Let us choose any bargaining problem C ∈ Σ, which is derived
from an underlying economic environment e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E . Suppose
F 6= FE. By (II), we can suppose that G (F (C)) 6= G ¡FE (C)¢ for this
C ∈ Σ. Then, there exists G∗ ∈ G (F (C)) \G ¡FE (C)¢. Given C, we define
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C (i) ≡ {C 0i ∈ K | ∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 : (C 0i,C−i) ∈ C} for each i ∈ N . For each
i ∈ N and each r ∈ R+, define
C (i; r) ≡ {C 0i ∈ C (i) | G (C 0i) = r} .
Let r∗ ≡ G∗. Consider comp {r∗} ≡ {x ∈ Rk+ : x ≤ r∗}, and C∗ ≡
G−1 (comp {r∗}). Since G is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence
C∗s ⊆ C∗ in which (i) for each r ∈ comp {r∗}, there exists a unique (Crii )i∈N ∈
C∗s such that Crii ∈ C (i; ri) for each i ∈ N ; (ii) for each r, r0 ∈ comp {r∗},
for each i ∈ N , Crii = C
r0i
i holds if ri = r
0
i and C
ri
i > C
r0i
i if ri > r
0
i; and (iii)
for any r0 ∈ comp {r∗}, limr→r0 (Crii )i∈N =
³
C
r0i
i
´
i∈N
holds. By definition,
G (C∗s ) = comp {r∗}.
Now, by using the information of C∗s , we are ready to construct e∗ =
(M∗,bc1, x∗) ∈ E , in which M∗ ∩M = ∅, #M∗ = 1, and x∗ = 1. Moreover,
for each i ∈ N , the opportunity correspondence bc1i is defined as follows:
(i) for all x ∈
£
0, 1
n
¤
, bc1i (x) = Cr0ii with r0i = nx · r∗i ; and
(ii) for all x ∈
¡
1
n
, 1
¤
, bc1 (x) = Cr∗ii .
Then, consider C∗∗ ≡ C (e∗) ∈ Σ.
By (CI), r∗ ∈ G (F (C∗∗)). Next, consider C4 ≡ ∪π∈Ππ (C∗∗). We will
construct a new economy e4 = (M4, c4n, x4) ∈ E such that C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4
and G
¡C ¡e4¢¢ = G ¡C4¢. First, define a opportunity correspondence cn :
[0, x∗]n → Rk+ by: for every x ∈ [0, x∗]
n, cn (x) ≡ ∪i∈Nbc1i (x). Consider e(n) =
(M∗(n), cn, (x∗)n) ∈ E , where cni = cn for every i ∈ N , and (x∗)n ≡(x∗, . . . ,x∗)| {z }
n-times
.
Then, C ¡e(n)¢ ⊇ C4, but G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ ) G ¡C4¢. Note that ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢
is homeomorphic to ∂G
¡C4¢. Thus, we can take a continuous bijection
λ : ∂G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ → ∂G ¡C4¢ such that for any r ∈ ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢, there
exists a scalor λr > 0 such that λ (r) = (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢. Since both
G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and G ¡C4¢ are symmetric, it must be true that, for any r, r0 ∈
∂G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and any i ∈ N , if ri = r0i, then λr · ri = λr0 · r0i. Consider the
opportunity correspondence c4n defined as follows. For any i ∈ N , if λr ·ri <
ri, then for any r ∈ (λr · ri, ri], and any x ∈ (cn)−1 ◦ G−1 (r), let c4n (x) ∈
G−1 (λr · ri); and for any (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢, any r ∈ [0,λr · ri], and any
x ∈ (cn)−1 ◦G−1 (r), let c4n (x) = cn (x). Then, (M∗(n), c4n, (x∗)n) ∈ E . Let
e4 ≡ (M∗(n), c4n, (x∗)n). By definition, C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4, and G ¡C ¡e4¢¢ =
G
¡C4¢.
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From the construction of C ¡e4¢, by (WE), (S), and (II), we must have
the following:
G
¡
F
¡C ¡e4¢¢¢ = ½Gµc4nµµ1∗
n
¶n¶¶¾
.
Let r4E ≡ G
¡
c4n
¡¡
1∗
n
¢n¢¢
, which is the egalitarian outcome for the prob-
lem C ¡e4¢. Since r4E ∈ ∂G (C∗∗), there exists Cr4E ∈ C∗∗ such that
G
³
Cr
4E
´
= r4E. Thus, by (CI),
©
r4E
ª
= G (F (C∗∗)), which is a desired
contradiction, since r∗ ∈ G (F (C∗∗)). Thus, G (F (C)) \G ¡FE (C)¢ = ∅. By
(II), clearly, F = FE.
4.2 The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
We now turn to a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Theorem 2: Let the social evaluation of opportunity R be homothetic. Then,
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution FK is the unique solution satisfying (WE),
(S), (IACC), (WCI) and (II).
Proof. First, it can be checked that FK satisfies the five axioms of the
theorem.
Next, we show that if a solution F satisfies the axioms of (WE), (S),
(IACC), (WCI) and (II), then F = FK . Let C ∈ Σ be an arbitrary prob-
lem derived from an underlying economic environment e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E .
Given this G (C), for each i ∈ N , let mi (G (C)) be the point such that
(mi (G (C)) ,0−i) ∈ G (C), and mi (G (C)) ≥ Gi for any G ∈ G (C) with
Gi as its i-th component. Also, let G
¡
FK (C)¢ ∈ ∂G (C) be the point in
the G-space of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Now, let us choose the n
dimensional positive vector a = (ai)i∈N ∈ Rn++ appropriately, so that
C0 = a · C ≡ ©a ·C = (ai · Ci)i∈N ⊆ Rkn+ | C ∈ Cª
has the property that, for each i ∈ N , mi (G (C0)) = 1. Note that
G
¡
FK (C0)¢ = a ·G ¡FK (C)¢ ≡ GK(C0)
has the property that, for each i ∈ N , GK(C
0)
i = r
K ∈ [0, 1].
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Suppose F 6= FK . By (II), we can suppose that G (F (C)) 6= G ¡FK (C)¢
for this C ∈ Σ. Then, there exists G∗ ∈ G (F (C)) \G ¡FK (C)¢. By (IACC),
a · G∗ ∈ G (F (C0)) \G ¡FK (C0)¢. Let r∗ ≡ a · G∗. Given the bargaining
problem C0, we define
C0 (i) ≡ ©C 0i ∈ K | ∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 : (C 0i,C−i) ∈ C0ª .
Next, for each i ∈ N and each r ∈ R+, we define
C0 (i; r) ≡ {C 0i ∈ C0 (i) | G (C 0i) = r} .
Let ei ≡ (mi (G (C0)) ,0−i) for each and every i ∈ N .
Consider comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en} ≡ {x ∈ Rk+ : x ≤ r∗} ∪ {x ∈ Rk+ : x ≤
e1} ∪ . . . ∪ {x ∈ Rk+ : x ≤ en}, and C00 ≡ G−1 (comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en}). Since
G is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence C00s ⊆ C00 in which (i)
for each r ∈ comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en}, there exists a unique (Crii )i∈N ∈ C00s such
that Crii ∈ C0 (i; ri) for each i ∈ N ; (ii) for each r, r0 ∈ comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en},
for each i ∈ N , Crii = C
r0i
i holds if ri = r
0
i and C
ri
i > C
r0i
i if ri > r
0
i; and (iii)
for any r0 ∈ comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en}, limr→r0 (Crii )i∈N =
³
C
r0i
i
´
i∈N
holds. By
definition, G (C00s ) = comp {r∗, e1, . . . , en}.
We now use the information about C00s to construct e00 = (M 00,bc1, x00) ∈ E ,
in which M 00 ∩ M = ∅, #M 00 = 1, and x00 = 1. For each i ∈ N , the
opportunity correspondence bc1i is defined as follows: for all x ∈ [0, 1],
(i) bc1i (1) = C1i , bc1i ¡ 1n¢ = Cr∗ii , and bc1i (0) = {0};
(ii) for all x ∈
¡
0, 1
2n
¢
, bc1i (x) = {0}; and
(ii) for all x ∈
¡
1
2n
, 1
n
¢
, bc1i (x) = Cr0i with r0 = 2n ¡x− 12n¢ · r∗i ; and
(iii) for all x ∈
¡
1
n
, n+1
2n
¢
, bc1i (x) = Cr∗ii ; and
(iv) for all x ∈
¡
n+1
2n
, 1
¢
, bc1i (x) = Cr00 with r00 = 2nx−(n+1)n−1 (1− r∗i ) + r∗i .
Then, C00s = C (e00) ∈ Σ.
By (WCI), r∗ ∈ G (F (C00s )). Next, consider C4 ≡ ∪π∈Ππ (C00s ). We will
construct a new economy e4 = (M4, c4n, x4) ∈ E such that C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4
and G
¡C ¡e4¢¢ = G ¡C4¢. First, define a opportunity correspondence cn :
[0, x00]n → Rk+ by: for every x ∈ [0, x00]
n, cn (x) ≡ ∪i∈Nbc1i (x). Consider e(n) =
(M 00(n), cn, (x00)n) ∈ E , where cni = cn for every i ∈ N , and (x∗)n ≡(x∗, . . . ,x∗)| {z }
n-times
.
Then, C ¡e(n)¢ ⊇ C4, but G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ ) G ¡C4¢. Note that ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢
is homeomorphic to ∂G
¡C4¢. Thus, we can take a continuous bijection
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λ : ∂G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ → ∂G ¡C4¢ such that for any r ∈ ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢, there
exists a scalor λr > 0 such that λ (r) = (−λr + ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢. Since
both G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and G ¡C4¢ are symmetric, it must be true that, for any
r, r0 ∈ ∂G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and any i ∈ N , if ri = r0i, then−λr+ri = −λr0+r0i. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can write λi (r) = −λri + ri. For any i ∈ N , if
−λri + ri < ri, then for any r ∈ (−λri + ri, ri], and any x ∈ (cn)−1 ◦G−1 (r),
let c4n (x) ∈ G−1 (−λri + ri). Moreover, for any (−λri + ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢,
any r ∈ [0,−λri + ri], and any x ∈ (cn)−1 ◦ G−1 (r), let c4n (x) = cn (x).
Then, (M∗(n), c4n, (x∗)n) ∈ E . Let e4 ≡ (M∗(n), c4n, (x∗)n). By definition,
C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4, and G ¡C ¡e4¢¢ = G ¡C4¢.
From the construction of C ¡e4¢, (WE), (S), and (II) imply that
G
¡
F
¡C ¡e4¢¢¢ = ½Gµc4nµµ1∗
n
¶n¶¶¾
.
Let r4K ≡ G
¡
c4n
¡¡
1∗
n
¢n¢¢
, which is the Kalai-Smorodinsky outcome for
the problem C ¡e4¢. Since r4K ∈ ∂G (C00s ), there exists Cr4K ∈ C00s such that
G
³
Cr
4K
´
= r4K . Thus, by (WCI),
©
r4K
ª
= G (F (C00s )), which is a desired
contradiction, since r∗ ∈ G (F (C00s )). Thus, G (F (C)) \G
¡
FK (C)¢ = ∅. By
(II), we can conclude that F = FK .
4.3 The Nash solution
In this subsection, we will provide a characterization of the Nash solution.
Theorem 3: Let the social evaluation of opportunity R be homothetic. Then,
the Nash solution FNA is the unique solution satisfying (E), (A), (IACC),
(CI) and (II).
To prove Theorem 3, we prove the following lemma, Lemma 1, first.
Lemma 1: Let the social evaluation of opportunity R be given, and G be the
real-valued representation of it. Then, for any C ∈ Σ and any two Pareto ef-
ficient points G
1
,G
2 ∈ ∂G (C) which are mutually diﬀerent, there exists e0 =
(M 0,ecm0 , x0) ∈ E such that C (e0) = C0 and C0 = G−1 ³compnG1,G2o´ ⊆ C.
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Proof. Given C ∈ Σ and any G1,G2 ∈ ∂G (C) which are mutually diﬀerent,
let us consider comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
. Let an economy e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E be such
that C (e) = C. Let C0 ≡ G−1
³
comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o´
. By definition, C0 ⊆ C.
Given this C0, let us define
C0 (i) ≡ ©C 0i ∈ K | ∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 : (C 0i,C−i) ∈ C0ª
for each i ∈ N . Then, for each r ≥ 0, define
C0 (i; r) ≡ {C 0i ∈ C0 (i) | G (C 0i) = r}
for each i ∈ N . Since G is continuous, we can choose a continuous sequence
C0s ⊆ C0 in which (i) for each r ∈ comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
, there exists a unique
(Crii )i∈N ∈ C0s such that Crii ∈ C0 (i; ri) for each i ∈ N ; (ii) for each r, r0 ∈
comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
, for each i ∈ N , Crii = C
r0i
i holds if ri = r
0
i and C
ri
i > C
r0i
i if
ri > r
0
i; and (iii) for any r
∗ ∈ comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
, limr→r∗ (C
ri
i )i∈N =
³
C
r∗i
i
´
i∈N
holds. By definition, G (C0s) = comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
.
We now construct e0 = (M 0, c1, x0) ∈ E , in which #M 0 = 1 and x0 = 1.
Let us denote the n−1-dimensional simplex by4. This simplex is interpreted
as the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations of the one dimensional commodity
x0 = 1. Each vertex ei ∈ 4 corresponds to the allocation that x0 is assigned
to individual i ∈ N and any other individual gets nothing. Now, take a
continuous bijection λ : ∂G (C0s) → 4 such that for any r ∈ ∂G (C0s), there
exists a scalor λr > 0 such that λ (r) = (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ 4. With the help of
this mapping, c1 of the underlying economy e0 = (M 0, c1, x0) ∈ E is defined
as follows: for each i ∈ N , c1i is such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], c1i (x) = Crii
whenever ri = (λr)
−1 (x). Then, C (e0) = C0s ∈ Σ holds. By definition,
G (C (e0)) = comp
n
G
1
,G
2
o
.
Proof of Theorem 3: It can be checked that FNA satisfies the five axioms
of the theorem. We need only to show that if a solution F satisfies the five
axioms specified in Theorem 3, then F = FNA.
Let F be a solution satisfying the five axioms of Theorem 3. Consider
any bargaining problem C ∈ Σ that is derived from an underlying economic
environment e = (M, cm, x) ∈ E . Consider the following problem:
max
(Ci)i∈N∈C
Y
i∈N
G (Ci) .
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The set of the above problem constitutes the Nash-solution set FNA (C) for
C.
Suppose F 6= FNA. By (II), we can suppose thatG (F (C)) 6= G ¡FNA (C)¢
for this C ∈ Σ. Then, either (i) there exists G∗ ∈ G (F (C)) \G ¡FNA (C)¢ or
(ii) G (F (C)) ( G ¡FNA (C)¢.
Consider case (i) first. Given the bargaining problem C, we define C (i) ≡
{C 0i ∈ K | ∃C−i ∈ Kn−1 : (C 0i,C−i) ∈ C} for each i ∈ N . LetGNA ∈ G
¡
FNA (C)¢
and G
∗ ∈ G (F (C)) \G ¡FNA (C)¢. Then, by Lemma 1, we can construct a
new economy e0 = (M 0,ec1, x0) ∈ E such that C (e0) = G−1 ³compnG∗,GNAo´ ⊆
C. Let C0 ≡ C (e0). By (CI), G∗ ∈ G (F (C0)). Note that since Qi∈N G∗i <Q
i∈N G
NA
i , there exists ε ∈ Rn+\ {0} such that
Q
i∈N
³
G
∗
i + εi
´
=
Q
i∈N G
NA
i .
Let r∗∗ ≡ G∗+ε. Since r∗∗ ≤m (G (C)), there exists a profile of opportunity
Cr
∗∗ ∈ Kn such that for each i ∈ N , Cr∗∗ii ∈ C (i), G
³
C
r∗∗i
i
´
= r∗∗i , and
C
r∗∗i
i ⊇ C
G
∗
i
i , where C
G
∗
i
i = G
−1
³
G
∗
i
´
. Then, we can construct another econ-
omy e00 = (M 00,bc1, x00) ∈ E such that C (e00) = G−1 ³compnr∗∗,GNAo´ ⊇
C0 ∪ ©Cr∗∗ª.
Given that
Q
i∈N (r
∗∗
i ) =
Q
i∈N G
NA
i , we choose the n dimensional pos-
itive vector a = (ai)i∈N ∈ Rn++ appropriately as in the proof of Theo-
rem 1 in Xu and Yoshihara (2005), so that (air∗∗i )i∈N = π
0
³³
aiG
NA
i
´
i∈N
´
and π0
¡
(air
∗∗
i )i∈N
¢
=
³
aiG
NA
i
´
i∈N
for some permutation π0 ∈ Π. By ho-
motheticity of R, e000 = (M 00,a·bc1, x00) ∈ E constitutes C000 ≡ C (e000) =
G−1
³
comp
n
a · r∗∗,a·GNA
o´
.
Next, consider C4 ≡ ∪π∈Ππ (C000). We will construct a new economy
e4 = (M4, c4n, x4) ∈ E such that C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4 and G ¡C ¡e4¢¢ = G ¡C4¢.
First, define a opportunity correspondence cn : [0, x00]n → Rk+ by: for every
x ∈ [0, x00]n, cn (x) ≡ ∪i∈Naibc1i (x). Let us consider e(n) = (M 00(n), cn, (x00)n) ∈
E , where cni = cn for every i ∈ N , and (x00)n ≡(x00, . . . ,x00)| {z }
n-times
. Then, C ¡e(n)¢ ⊇
C4, but G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ ) G ¡C4¢. Note that ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ is homeomorphic
to ∂G
¡C4¢. Thus, we can take a continuous bijection λ : ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ →
∂G
¡C4¢ such that for any r ∈ ∂G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢, there exists a scalor λr > 0 such
that λ (r) = (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢. Since both G ¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and G ¡C4¢ are
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symmetric, it is true that for any r, r0 ∈ ∂G
¡C ¡e(n)¢¢ and any i ∈ N , if
ri = r
0
i, then λ
r · ri = λr0 · r0i. For any i ∈ N , if λr · ri < ri, then for
any r ∈ (λr · ri, ri], and any x ∈ (cn)−1 ◦G−1 (r), let c4n (x) ∈ G−1 (λr · ri).
Moreover, for any (λr · ri)i∈N ∈ ∂G
¡C4¢, any r ∈ [0,λr · ri], and any x ∈
(cn)−1 ◦ G−1 (r), let c4n (x) = cn (x). Then, (M 00(n), c4n, (x00)n) ∈ E . Let
e4 ≡ (M 00(n), c4n, (x00)n). By definition, C ¡e4¢ ⊇ C4, and G ¡C ¡e4¢¢ =
G
¡C4¢.
From the construction of C ¡e4¢, (E) and (A) imply thatn
a · r∗∗, a·GNA
o
∪
n
π (a · r∗∗) ,π
³
a ·GN
´o
π∈Π
= G
¡
F
¡C ¡e4¢¢¢ .
Thus, by (CI),
n
a · r∗∗, a·GNA
o
= G (F (C000)). By (IACC),
n
r∗∗,G
NA
o
=
G (F (C (e00))). By (CI),
n
G
NA
o
= G (F (C0)), a contradiction since G∗ ∈
G (F (C0)). Therefore, G (F (C)) \G ¡FNA (C)¢ = ∅.
Now, consider case (ii). Since G (F (C)) ( G ¡FNA (C)¢, by (II), we can
suppose that
n
r∗∗,G
NA
o
⊆ G
¡
FNA (C)¢, but GNA /∈ G (F (C)). Then,
consider comp
n
r∗∗,G
NA
o
. Following a similar proof method as for case (i),
we can derive another contradiction.
The two cases (i) and (ii) exhaust all possibilities. Therefore, it must be
true that F = FNA.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the standard bargaining model to situations
in which players are characterized by their opportunity sets rather than by
their utilities and in which the fair arbitrator makes the recommendation with
the guiding principle of equal opportunity for all players. In such a setting, we
have formulated our problems in terms of bargaining problems among players
on opportunity assignments, defined several solution concepts such as the
Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kasai-Smorodinsky solution
in our contex and studied them axiomatically. Most of the axioms used in our
axiomatic characterization of the proposed solutions are their counterparts
in standard bargaining models. We have discussed and commented on the
axioms that are unique in our context.
19
In the standard bargaining model with individual utilities and in eco-
nomic environment, Roemer (1986, 1988) shows that the principle of equality
of resource (Dworkin (1981)) characterizes the egalitarian solutions.5 How
is our approach in the paper related to the theory of equality of opportunity
discussed by Roemer (1998)? There are some diﬀerences between our ap-
proach in this paper and Roemer’s model (1998). For exmaple, for Roemer
(1998), the task is to propose a social welfare function that determines the
optimal equal opportunity policy, while in this paper, we define and charac-
terize “fair” solutions for bargaining problems based on players’ opportunity
sets. There are also similarities between our model and Roemer’s model. In
Roemer (1998), the resource allocation determined by the optimal policy is
to guarantee any two individuals the equal opportunity of accessing to the
same level of “advantages” regardless of their “types”, if their eﬀort rankings
within their own “types” are identical. In our model, an individual’s type in
the sense of Roemer is reflected in the individual’s opportunity correspon-
dence, and a bargaining solution such as FE determines a resource allocation
to guarantee an equitable assignment of opportunities among individuals, un-
der which every individual may access to the same level of living-condition
vectors.
In a similar bargaining model to Roemer’s, Yoshihara (2003, 2005) shows
that the Nash solution is the most plausible bargaining solution for the
Dworkinian resource egalitarianism if one uses the principle of responsibility
and compensation as discussed in Fleurbaey (1998). According to Yoshihara
(2003, 2005), the scale invariance axiom in the standard bargaining model
with individual utilities can be regarded as an axiom of responsibility for
individual utility functions, while the monotonicity type axiom and the con-
traction independence axiom can be seen as axioms of compensation. It
would be interesting to examine how responsibility and compensation may
be incorporated into our model. One possibility is that, given an individual is
characterized by his/her opportunity correspondence, we can identify those
factors that the individual is responsible. For example, when there is an
enlargement or shrinkage of an individual’s opportunity set, we can ask the
question: is the individual responsible for such a change of his opportunity
sets? As a consequence, in our framework, one can perhaps argue that the
5Herrero (1996) discusses a similar-type bargaining model, although in her model, in-
dividuals’ well-beings are not assumed to be their subjective utilities, but are indices of
their capabilities.
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axiom IACC may be interpreted as a responsibility axiom. Contraction-type
axioms may then be regarded as compensation axioms. Therefore, in our
framework, we believe that there is room to incorporate responsibility and
compensation. We leave these for future occasions.
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